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Judging the Expert
THOMAS A.WISEMAN, JR.*
Judge Higginbotham called it one of the most "vexing problems
currently facing the federal courts."' He was addressing the role of experts
in federal litigation and the role of the trial judge in judging the expert.
Nearly every trial judge, state or federal, has faced the problem of whether
or not to allow an expert to express an opinion. The use of experts has
proliferated beyond belief. There are experts on every conceivable subject,
some of whom advertise in the legal periodicals and others who find the
proper expert for you. The judge often is faced with the fairly obvious
conclusion that this so-called expert is really "anybody's dog that will
hunt." As a result of the great increase in product liability, medical
malpractice, and toxic tort litigation, the use and availability of experts has
multiplied. Undoubtedly, there are among them some intellectual
prostitutes. 2
There are attendant social and economic costs that should concern the
trial judge. The existence of "junk scientists" 3 and partisan "hired guns"
discourages the participation of serious scientists in the process. Potentially
useful drugs and products can be withheld from production and sale
because of adverse judgments. Risk-allocation costs can add substantially to
the cost of products to the consumer. Litigation costs and judgments can
prove fatal to corporations long after the alleged egregious tortious act
takes place.4
It is not a new problem, as the Supreme Court noted in 1858:
"Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be
experts may be obtained to any amount .... 5
* Judge, United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee.
I Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir.
1989) (Higginbotham, I., concurring in dissent), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
2 See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modem Expert
Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986). "[Elxpert witnesses are not necessarily
always unbiased scientists. They are paid by one side for their testimony.... [Tihe
potential for exaggeration and fraud on the court is present and may be impossible to
discover without close inspection and careful consideration of the record." Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
3 The term "junk science" was popularized by Peter W. Huber. See PETER W.
HUBER, GALILEo's REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
4 See Barry M. Epstein & Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony
in Product Liability Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 656, 661-63 (1987).
5 Winans v. New York & E.R.R., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858).
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The trial judge is faced with a philosophical dichotomy. The
conservative/passive judge, who views her role as that of a referee in a
jury trial, and who believes that the adversary process will refine the truth,
will allow expert testimony for what it is worth, leaving to the lawyers on
cross-examination and in counter-expert testimony to attack its weight.6
The activist/interventionist judge, who feels obligated to "find the truth"
and spare the jury from misleading, confusing testimony bearing an "aura"
of reliability, will evaluate and rule on the qualifications and reliability of
an expert's testimony as a question of admissibility. The latter seems to be
the trend in recent years, although characterized as "disturbing" by some
scholars. 7
THE GATEKEEPER'S JOB
The job of choosing between diametrically opposite expert opinions is
an almost impossible task for jurors, and judges are not very well qualified
for the task either. Learned Hand observed over ninety years ago:
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury... general truths derived
from his specialized experience. But how can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to
their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the
expert is necessary at all. 8
Nevertheless, if trial judges did not have it already, the "gatekeeper's" job
has been cast upon them in the federal system by the Supreme Court's
1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.9 Before
Daubert, the Frye test' ° was the majority rule and the rule in the Sixth
6 See, e.g., Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir.
1981); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975).
7 See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals
Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in
Common Law Courts, 51 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1, 9 n.40 (1989).
8 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 54 (1901); see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that "[]udges... have no special
competence to resolve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt
to link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984).
9 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).10 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Circuit. Under this test, the admissibility of scientific evidence depended
upon whether it was based on scientific principles that were sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belonged. The Sixth Circuit took Frye one step further and
required that the expert's opinion or deduction itself be in "conformity to a
generally accepted explanatory theory.""
In Daubert, a unanimous Supreme Court held that Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded the Frye test and that it is no
longer a precondition to admissibility in federal litigation for an expert's
opinion to be based on scientific principles that have gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. A seven member majority
then offered some advice to the trial judges on how to exercise their
discretion as the gatekeepers. Judges are directed to use Rule 104 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and hear testimony out of the presence of the
jury on "whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue."12 The judge must make "a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue." 13 The majority expressed confidence
"that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review." 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, expressed
confidence in the federal judiciary as well; however, he also confessed
doubt that Rule 702 conferred either the obligation or the authority upon
federal trial judges to become "amateur scientists" in order to perform that
role. 15 To "obligation" and "authority," one should add "capacity." Are
judges really up to the task of understanding esoteric scientific testimony in
the first place, and then distinguishing between what is good and bad
science?
11 United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977). This distinction
was pointed out by Judge Guy in his dissent in United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d
1186, 1217 (6th Cir. 1987) (Guy, J., dissenting), aftd, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). He noted
that the court was focusing on the deduction rather than the methodology by which the
deduction was made. Judge Guy's distinction was more consonant with Federal Rule
of Evidence 703, as well. The Rule refers to "facts or data" upon which an "opinion
or inference" is based as being those reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.12 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
13 Id.
14 1d.
15 Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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THE JUDGES' DILEMMA
How does the judge perform this gatekeeper role? In what principled
way shall the expert be judged? First, I suggest, any judge's dilemma is an
advocate's opportunity. As is the case in every similar situation, the judge
will be dependent upon good lawyers to spell out the issues, suggest the
parameters, and urge the conclusion. Justice Blackmun and the Daubert
majority make some "observations" of some of the "[mI]any factors [that]
will bear on the inquiry": 16 (1) Has the purported scientific knowledge
been or can it be tested? (2) Has it been subjected to peer review? (3) What
is the potential rate of error? and (4) How much acceptance does it have
within the relevant scientific community? 17 Judges then are reminded to
consider Rules 703, 706, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
703 requires that if opinions are based upon inadmissible facts or data,
these data or facts must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."' 8
Rule 706 allows the appointment of the court's own expert, and Rule 403
is the balancing rule of probative value versus unfair prejudice. The
Daubert majority also encourages the use of Rule 50(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to direct judgment, the use of Rule 56 to grant
summary judgment, and the use of the authority of the trial court, as well
as of the appellate court, to reverse a jury verdict based upon insufficient
evidence. 19 The Court adds a caveat, reminding the judge not to confuse
the role of judge and jury by forgetting that "[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof [rather than exclusion] are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."20
These observations and suggestions might also include: (5) Is the
underlying data untrustworthy for hearsay or other reasons?21 and (6) How
16 Id. at 2796.
17 Id. at 2796-97. Each of the four Daubert factors is carefully considered in
relation to the acceptance of DNA evidence in United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d
1144, 1152-56 (9th Cir.), cert denied, No. 94-7206, 1995 WL 21655 (U.S. Jan. 23,
1995).
18 FED R. EviD. 703.
19 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
20 /d.
21 See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub non.
Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). District Court Judge Weinstein
found the opinions of two experts who had partially based their opinions on hearsay
questionnaires to the plaintiffs to be hearsay and unreliable. Id. at 1245-48. He also
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far out is it? This approach is another way of looking at the "relevant
scientific community" question posed by Daubert. It is also the Frye test
without being "fried." Although the Frye test is no longer controlling, it is
still highly relevant. Judge Weinstein articulated the issue well in In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation:22 "When either the expert's
qualifications or his testimony lie at the periphery of what the scientific
community considers acceptable, special care should be exercised in
evaluating the reliability and probative worth of the proffered testimony
under Rules 703 and 403." The opinion of the leading professional
societies about the specialty of the alleged expert should bear heavily on
this question. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,23 Judge Guy rejected
a "clinical ecologist's" testimony because, inter alia, "[t]he leading
professional societies in the specialty of allergy and immunology, the
American Academy of Allergy and Immunology (AAAI) and the California
Medical Association (CMA), have rejected clinical ecology as an unproven
methodology lacking any scientific basis in either fact or theory."
Finally, the experience and common sense of the judge come into
play.24 The gatekeeper's role boils down to assessing reliability and
credibility, in fairness to both sides, with a healthy respect for the
traditional function of the jury.
RAISING THE QUESTION
In a civil case, the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony should
be raised as soon as it appears pretrial. In 1993, Rule 26(a)(2) was added
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It offers an inexpensive and
effective way to test the admissibility of questionable expert testimony very
took judicial notice "that no reputable physician relies on hearsay checklists by
litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the cause of their afflictions." Id. at
1246.
The "survey method" is also relied upon by experts purporting to testify as to
valuation of "hedonic damages," the loss of the ability to enjoy life. In this method,
individuals are asked to state what they would be willing to pay to reduce their chance
of dying by a specified percentage. The unreliability of such a survey, in addition to
its hearsay character, is compounded by the apparent impossibility of an honest
answer to the question. If asked the amount one would be willing to accept to
voluntarily depart this life, it seems that the answers received would be a joke. See the
author's opinion in Hein v. Merck & Co., No. 3-93-0541, 1994 WL 661834 (M.D.
Tenn. Nov. 22, 1994).
22 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
23 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988).
24 Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1246.
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early in the process. This new rule requires the automatic disclosure of the
identity of any person who may be used to present expert testimony at
trial. The disclosure must include a written report prepared and signed by
the witness that contains a "complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed and the basis and reasons therefor."25 The report also must
contain the data or other information considered in forming the opinion, as
well as other information regarding the expert's qualifications. At the
initial case management conference held under Rule 16 and the Civil
Justice Reform Act 26 plan in the particular district, counsel should insist
upon early disclosure of experts as part of the plan.
When a party receives a Rule 26 disclosure statement and believes that
the testimony does not meet the requirements of Daubert, that party can
file a motion in limine attacking the proffered testimony or the expert's
qualifications. In a recent case before the United States District Court of
the Middle District of Tennessee,27 the plaintiff proposed to use an expert
from California on "hedonic damages." A Rule 26 disclosure statement had
been supplied. To avoid the expense of traveling to California to take the
alleged expert's deposition or bringing the expert to Tennessee for trial and
a Rule 104 hearing during trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine with
the Rule 26 statement attached. Based on the motion and accompanying
statement, the court determined that the proffered testimony was unreliable
and inadmissible.28 The case subsequently settled.
Another valuable pretrial tool is to file a motion for summary judgment
or partial summary judgment on those claims or defenses that are based
upon questionable expert testimony. After the Rule 26 disclosure statement
has been filed or the proffered expert has been deposed, the opposing party
can assemble counter proof to form the basis of a summary judgment
motion. A party can file an opposing expert's affidavits, Rule 26
statements, and depositions to demonstrate the "off-the-wall" nature of the
questioned testimony and its failure to meet the Daubert standards. Such a
pretrial filing allows the court to make an early determination of the
question. The test is whether the evidence supporting the expert's position
is insufficient to allow reasonable jurors to conclude that the position is
more likely true than not.29
25 FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
26 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
27 Hein v. Merck & Co., No. 3-93-0541, 1994 WL 661834 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
22, 1994).
28 Id. at *5.
29 See Glaser v. Thompson Medical Co., 32 F.3d 969, 976 (6th Cir. 1994). In
this case, the district court had granted summary judgment to the defendant. In a two-
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In Daubert, the Court recommended the use of Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) to make this determination. 30 A hearing, usually out of the
presence of the jury, may be held either pretrial on a motion in limine31 or
during the trial when the expert is proffered. 32 In criminal trials, a party
most often will raise the issue during the trial and request a Rule 104
hearing, 33 although the issue could also be raised pretrial by a motion in
limine.34 The issue also may be addressed in a motion for judgment as a
matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) at the
conclusion of the proof of an adversary, 35 or by motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b). 36
to-one opinion, the majority of the Sixth Circuit panel applied the Daubert factors and
found the expert testimony sufficiently methodologically valid and supported to create
a material issue of disputed fact, and reversed and remanded for trial. The dissent
applied the Daubert factors and reached the opposite conclusion.
Other recent cases reviewing grant of summary judgment and applying Daubert
factors include Jacobelli Construction, Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 24-25
(2d Cir. 1994); Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 812-14 (6th Cir.
1994); Hayes v. Raytheon Co., 23 F.3d 410, No. 92-4004, 1994 WL 143000 (7th Cir.
Apr. 21, 1994); Sorensen ex rel. Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 645-51 (8th
Cir. 1994); and Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 29 F.3d 499, 500-03 (9th Cir.
1994).30 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
31 A five-day pretrial hearing was held in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 732 (3d Cir. 1994), and the expert testimony was excluded by
the trial judge, id. at 732, and then reviewed in a lengthy opinion by Judge Becker of
the Third Circuit, affirming on some issues and reversing and remanding on others,
id. at 798-99. Judge Becker introduced a new twist to the review of such decisions.
Instead of the deference of "clearly erroneous" or "manifestly erroneous" abuse of
discretion standards other courts have applied, Judge Becker said review requires a
"hard look" to insure that the district court's exercise of discretion was sound and that
it correctly applied the Daubert factors. Id. at 749-50. See infra the discussion of
standards of review. See also Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259 (1st Cir.
1993) (involving pretrial exclusion of expert testimony on motion in limine).
32 Cy. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994).
33 See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 1993).
34 See United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
63 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1994); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161,
1182 (1st Cir.), denial ofpost-conviction relief aff'd, 15 F.3d 1216 (1st Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994).
35 See Thomas v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 91-5326, 1993 WL 369129, at
*1 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993) (per curiam).
36 See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311-15 (5th
Cir. 1989), cited with approval in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
1994] 1111
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
THE STANDARD OF REV]EW
The decision of the judge made during trial to admit or exclude
evidence generally is said to be broadly discretionary. It is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard and is reversible only if "manifestly
erroneous. " 37 This standard also applies to the case of a pretrial motion in
limine in which witnesses are heard. 38 However, Judge Becker of the Third
Circuit has added his own supervisory gloss to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the case law on this subject. He says that, instead of an
abuse of discretion standard, in view of the "enormous power of the
district court to foreclose submission of a party's case to a jury, . . . the
review requires a 'hard look' to insure that the district court's exercise of
discretion was sound and that it correctly applied the several Daubert
factors. 39 This creation of a new and higher standard of review appears to
be without authority or precedent. It has not been followed by any other
circuit as of this writing.
Review of the grant of summary judgment based upon analysis of
plaintiff's expert proof under Daubert is plenary and de novo.40
S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993); cf. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175
(3d Cir. 1993).
37 Cy United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
district court had broad discretion to admit expert testimony and using a "manifestly
erroneous" standard of review), cert. denied sub nom. Gotti v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1645 (1994); Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the
abuse of discretion standard); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir.
1993) (affirming trial court's admission of evidence by holding that findings of district
court with regard to general acceptance of expert testimony were not clearly
erroneous); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1014 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"trial court has broad discretion in admitting and excluding expert testimony, and [the
court of appeals] will sustain the trial court's action unless it is manifestly erroneous").
38 See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that trial court had broad discretion to exclude demonstrative evidence intended to be
illustrative of scientific principles and affirming exclusion). Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses."
39 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 733 (3d Cir. 1994); see
also id. at 749-50.
40 Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 812 (6th Cir. 1994); Hayes v.
Raytheon Co., 23 F.3d 410, No. 92-4004, 1994 WL 143000, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 21,
1994); Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 1993).
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CONCLUSION
The gatekeeper's role is a challenge to the federal trial judge.
However, it is both a challenge and an opportunity to the lawyer. The
opportunity to keep out potentially damaging testimony or the opportunity
to try to get in marginally admissible but potentially very helpful testimony
is the essence of good lawyering. These opportunities also will be grist for
the scholarly mill. Only one year after its rendition, there are 103 circuit
court opinions and 120 district court opinions on Westlaw that cite
Daubert. Difficult as it may be to apply in some instances, the Daubert
standard of admissibility is more flexible and far superior to the Frye rule.

